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RÉSUMÉ
Cet article examine les racines des “événements”
tragiques des années 1980 en Nouvelle-Calédonie,
en argumentant que le réveil kanak de 1969 résultait
d’une convergence de forces structurelles puissan-
tes, telles que la recolonisation du territoire par la
France dans les années 1960, accompagnée d’une
immigration massive pendant le boom du nickel,
ainsi que le retour chez eux des étudiants kanak et
calédoniens qui avaient été radicalisés en France,
où ils avaient vécu la révolte des étudiants et ouvriers
en mai 1968. La tendance graduelle vers l’autono-
mie de l’Union calédonienne a été interrompue,
mais la défense de l’indépendance kanak révolution-
naire polarise la population par des clivages ethniques
et politiques. Aujourd’hui, alors que la France est en
train de redonner plus d’autonomie à la Nouvelle-
Calédonie, deux visions de la nationalité sont en
concurrence : rester loyal à la France ou bien deve-
nir un état souverain. 
MOTS-CLÉS : décolonisation, radicalisation, réveil
kanak, Foulards rouges, identité kanak, polarisa-
tion.
ABSTRACT
This article examines the roots of the tragic
“events” of the 1980s in New Caledonia, arguing
that the Kanak Awakening of 1969 resulted from a
convergence of powerful structural forces, such as
the recolonization of the territory by France in the
1960s, accompanied by massive immigration during
a nickel mining boom, and the return home of radi-
calized Kanak and Caledonian students from France,
where they had experienced the May 1968 student-
worker uprising. The gradual, multi-ethnic trend
toward autonomy by the Union calédonienne had
been interrupted, but the advocacy of revolutionary
Kanak Independence polarized the population along
ethnic and political lines. Today, France is again
granting autonomy to New Caledonia, but two
visions of nationhood are in competition: remaining
loyal to France or becoming a sovereign state.
KEYWORDS: decolonization, radicalization, Kanak
awakening, Foulards rouges, indigenous identity,
polarization.
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In such a climate, the action of small groups of extremists can be an effective catalyst
in a moment when the habitual political structures find themselves weakened. […] This
demands that the Administration exercise particular vigilance. 
(Risterucci, French High Commissioner, New Caledonia, August 19691)
In 1969, the leader of the [Foulards Rouges] movement was imprisoned along with
some of my old school mates after a protest. It was a shock for me and marked the
beginning of my awareness about the independence struggle. 
(Gorodé, Pacific Magazine, May 2001: 10)
The annual commemoration of 24th Septem-
ber, the date in 1853 when a French admiral
unilaterally “took possession” of the islands of
New Caledonia to help France compete with
England as a colonial power (LNC, 24/09/2002),
remains a contested identity symbol, despite
two negotiated peace accords since the tragic
“Events” of the 1980s. This essay will examine
the roots of those Events, arguing that the eth-
nic and political polarization that caused inter-
communal violence in the 1980s was not sim-
ply a product of long-term racial tension or of
Cold War ideologies. Instead, it emerged from
a convergence of forces around the year 1969,
which pushed politics toward a more direct
confrontation between self-determination and
colonial rule. New political parties and coali-
tions, class divisions, a generation gap, tensions
between tradition and modernity, changing
demographic ratios, a nickel boom followed by
a recession and increased economic depend-
ency, and outside influences from France and
beyond, all contributed to a process that would
culminate in the Events. 
One powerful force was what anti-colonial
radicals called the “recolonization” of New
Caledonia: Paris had granted the territory sig-
nificant powers of self-government in the
1950s, and then withdrew them unilaterally in
the 1960s. The Union calédonienne (UC),
which had dominated local politics for a gener-
ation, objected strongly but was powerless to
stop this centralizing trend and lost many sup-
porters. New immigration during the nickel
boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s also
helped to change the electorate to an anti-
autonomist majority. A dramatic counter-force
appeared in 1969, the year when such Jacobin-
ism reached its peak, because radical university
students returned from France, having experi-
enced the May 1968 student-worker uprising.
A handful of Kanak and Caledonian youth pro-
tested actively against the Gaullist reprise en
main. Although they at first lacked a mass base,
except on Mare, they forced changes in local
political discourse, organization and tactics,
because they felt that the indigenous and labor-
ing masses might never regain control over
their own destiny. What developed were rival
visions of nationhood and of decolonization. 
Postwar Decolonization 
In the modern history of the Kanak people,
colonization after 1853 was an intrusion that
redrew the political boundaries of New Caledo-
nia, inscribing on the islands new arenas of
identity formation2. It also assaulted the indig-
enous Melanesian civilization on numerous
levels, defining its otherness against powerful
European cultural and economic assumptions.
Settlers claimed to bring peace and develop-
ment and, through the French language, unity
to the divided inhabitants (Chatenay, 1993:
328). Yet in practice, French colonization in
New Caledonia was one of the most extreme
cases of native denigration, incarceration and
dispossession in Oceania. A frontier of cattle
ranches, convict camps, mines and coffee
farms moved across the main island of Grande
Terre, conquering indigenous resisters and
confining them to reserves that amounted to
less than ten per cent of the land (Saussol,
1979; Merle, 1995). In the Pacific region, only
the British settler colonies in Australia, New
Zealand, and North America marginalized the
indigenous people more. But New Caledonia
never became what Alfred Crosby has called a
1. High Commissioner report to Secretary of State for DOM-TOMs (Départements d’Outre-mer et territoires d’Outre-
mer), n° 310, 13 August 1969, Fonds 107W: 799, Archives territoriales de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (hereafter AT).
2. Indigenous Melanesians, who have twenty-eight languages, became known as Canaques (later Kanak), from the
Hawaiian word for person, kanaka, which traveled around the Pacific on trade ships and plantations. The white settlers,
however, became known as Calédoniens (later Caldoches), from British explorer James Cook’s decision to name the
main island of Grande Terre after Scotland (the old Caledonia). 
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“neo-Europe”3 because Europeans remained a
minority, as in Hawai‘i, where non-white labor-
ers provided immigrant groups with a demo-
graphic majority4. Despite their myths of being
individualistic pioneers and prospectors, French
colons exploited local resources using the cheap
labor of convicts, Kanak forced laborers, or
indentured Asians and New Hebrideans. “After
all”, a French administrator said in 1896, “coloni-
zation is only a business” (Delignon, 1898:173). 
Missionaries and a few humane officials tried
to aid the native people (Lambert, 1999), but
the 1931 Colonial Exposition in Paris still por-
trayed them as savages, even loaning some to a
Berlin zoo in exchange for crocodiles (Mwà
véé, 1996). What shook up this structure of
colonial domination was the fall of France in
1940, when the mère patrie itself became,
directly or indirectly, a temporary colony of
Nazi Germany (Césaire, 1955). New Caledoni-
ans rallied to Charles de Gaulle’s Free France
on the 19th of September, 1940 and deported
Vichy supporters and Japanese residents5. But
the isolation from France in World War II
inspired new visions of autonomy, albeit
Rhodesian-style, and also made the territory
more dependent on its regional allies. Aus-
tralia replaced Japan as a buyer of New Caledo-
nian minerals, and a major United States mili-
tary presence during the war caused a boom in
the local economy. The wage-earning Melane-
sian labor force outside their reserves tripled,
and more than a thousand Melanesians served
in the French armed forces, creating a new
political element after the war, when Melane-
sians would receive freedom of movement and
citizenship rights. In addition, a local Commu-
nist Party emerged from the wartime alliance
with the Soviet Union. It organized mine work-
ers, especially poor whites and Vietnamese, and
recruited Melanesians into an anti-colonial
movement that still remained loyal to reform-
minded postwar France (Kurtovitch, 2000). 
At Brazzaville in 1944, Charles de Gaulle
had promised new political rights and eco-
nomic development to Free French loyalists in
the colonies, and in 1946 France abolished the
discriminatory indigénat and forced labor. Yet
the goal was decolonization without separa-
tism, i.e. assimilation into equal relations with
the métropole so that France could regain its
lost status in the world community. Regarding
New Caledonia, French officials recommended
not only a liberal policy but also renewed
migration from the mother country to consoli-
date the French presence in the Pacific (Aldrich,
1993: 55-56). Since the 1789 revolution, French
republican thinkers had regarded the “nation”
as a willful construction that bound citizens
together with equal rights (Bell), but clearly
there was potential tension between full integra-
tion into the mother country and building one’s
own patrie. Meanwhile, the United Nations
Charter of 1945 urged its members to promote
not only the socio-economic development of
“non-self-governing territories” but also their
political self-determination, adding the rather
equivocal caveat, “according to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples
and their varying stages of advancement”. Most
colonial powers, including France, would
refuse even to submit information about their
overseas territories to the UN in the early post-
war era. In 1960, the UN would harden its moral
support for decolonization, creating the Com-
mittee of 24 to monitor it, but the UN would also
recognize integration, in addition to free asso-
ciation or independence, as one way to end
colonial (unequal) status (Roff, 1991: 5-10). 
Alarmed by the success of the “atheist”
Communist Party in recruiting Melanesian
members after the war, the Catholic and Protes-
tant missions organized associations in 1947 to
promote Melanesian rights and welfare. They
copied the mobilization tactics of the Commu-
nists and groomed Melanesian leaders who
began to speak, not of the diverse identities
among more than two dozen indigenous lan-
guage groups, but of the native people as a
whole. Both church associations promoted
modernization and equal rights but also the pro-
tection of native reserves and customs. In 1951,
they supported Maurice Lenormand in the elec-
tion for Deputy to Paris, and he won, benefiting
3. In his 1993 book, Alfred Crosby argues that European colonists brought along familiar crops and animals and so
outnumbered indigenous populations devastated by conquest and new epidemics that they transformed the new lands
demographically, ecologically and economically, thus replicating Europe in various ways.
4. Imagine if almost half the population of Australia, New Zealand, Canada or the United States were indigenous
today, as the Kanak are in New Caledonia. How might it affect their “national” politics?
5. The government confiscated the property of local Japanese, later auctioning off their mines and other holdings to
European residents. See Philippe Palombo (2002).
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from the expanding Melanesian electorate.
Maurice Lenormand was also careful to side
with the petits Blancs against the ruling “fifty
families” of the colon bourgeoisie. In 1953, the
centennial of French annexation, he led the
newly-formed UC to victory in the election for
General Council, winning 15 of 25 seats
(including nine Melanesians) on a platform of
“two colors, one people” (Kurtovitch, 2000).
Over the next generation, the UC won majorities
in elections and built up the country’s social wel-
fare system (Henningham, 1992: 51-54). In his
vision of decolonization, Maurice Lenormand
spoke of a unified Caledonian “personality” that
could democratically govern its own affairs, as
the French constitution permitted regions to
do (Lenormand, 1953: 294-95). This progress
under the Fourth Republic culminated the loi-
cadre (Defferre) of 1956, which granted New
Caledonia a Territorial Assembly (TA) elected
by universal suffrage, which would in turn
choose an executive Governing Council (GC)
whose local Vice-President and cabinet minis-
ters would now have real administrative portfo-
lios (Henningham, 1992: 55).
New Caledonia had thus achieved a kind of
autonomy under the leadership of a multi-
racial, progressive party, the UC, whose power
was based on gradual promotion of the indige-
nous majority and class-oriented appeals to
poor white and Asian workers. But events in
Algeria would soon jeopardize those gains.
French Socialists had campaigned in the 1955
election on a platform of decolonization, and
the loi-cadre was essentially their peace plan
for Africa. But the independence war in Algeria
complicated matters, because it was a settler
colony. Based on their experience in World
War II, Gaullists saw the empire as crucial to
French prestige and power and actively helped
to undermine the weak Fourth Republic. When
paratroopers sided with the pied noir Commit-
tee of Public Safety in Algiers in May 1958 and
even seized Corsica, Charles de Gaulle himself
came out of retirement to found the Fifth
Republic. Although he was willing to let Alge-
ria go, he intended to hold on to the remaining
overseas territories (Kahler, 1984). New Cale-
donian loyalists felt that the loi-cadre had been
inappropriate for their islands, and like-minded
French army officers helped to fuel their dis-
content. On the 18th of June 1958, the annual
commemoration of Charles de Gaulle’s war-
time call to rally to Free France, Caledonian set-
tlers demonstrated in Noumea. They demanded
the removal of Maurice Lenormand and the UC,
created a Vigilance Committee, harassed UC
officials and barricaded roads, pushing the
French Governor to dissolve the GC. A pied
noir who migrated to Noumea would call that
action “the first serious stand against the expan-
sionism of the Union calédonienne” (Maresca,
1980: 13-24; Chatenay, 1993: 267-73).
A Decade of Recolonization 
In the referendum of September 1958 that
ratified the new republic, 98% of New Cale-
donian voters chose to remain in the French
Community. Two months later the UC again
won the TA election, with assurance from
Paris that the loi-cadre would still apply. But
the new French High Commissioner in Nou-
mea, Laurent Péchoux, had experience in sup-
pressing native nationalism in Côte d’Ivoire.
In 1959, with the support of Gaullist Premier
Michel Debré in Paris, he began a decade-long
process of stripping away the powers of self-
government that New Caledonia had acquired
since World War II. First, Laurent Péchoux
took away Maurice Lenormand’s control of
the civil service, police and radio station.
Then, invoking the law against accumulating
high offices, he also forced Maurice Lenor-
mand to give up being Vice-President of the
GC in order to remain Deputy to Paris. Laurent
Péchoux expressed satisfaction that his “rapid
return backwards” had caused New Caledo-
nia’s “definitive reattachment and confident
relations with the Mother Country” (Péchoux,
1959). The UC began to lose leaders to the
opposition, and in April 1962, when Algeria
finally won its independence, bombs were set
in Noumea. One in front of the TA failed to go
off, but another exploded in the UC headquar-
ters. Ironically, the court convicted Maurice
Lenormand for failing to prevent the latter
crime and took away his civil rights for five
years. Laurent Péchoux left New Caledonia
that same year (Maresca, 1980: 28-38). 
The retaking of possession would continue in
the 1960s, even though Western Samoa and
Nauru, with UN help, became the first colonies
in Oceania to achieve independence, and the
Cook Islands chose Free Association with
New Zealand. In September 1963, Secretary
of State for DOM-TOMs Louis Jacquinot vis-
ited New Caledonia, but Roch Pidjot, Maurice
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Lenormand’s Melanesian successor as Vice-
President, urged UC followers to boycott the
official welcome. Soon afterwards, the loi Jac-
quinot stripped the GC of its ministerial powers,
leaving it only a consultative role. Paris would
take over control of secondary and technical
education as well, citing a lack of local funds
and trained personnel. The UC campaigned in
the 1967 TA election on a platform of restoring
the loi-cadre and won 69% of the votes. In
early 1968, the TA voted 23-8 for internal
autonomy and sent a delegation to Paris, but
DOM-TOM Minister Pierre Billotte refused even
to see them (Thompson and Adloff, 1971: 326).
In January 1969, the three lois Billotte took
away territorial control over mining, large-scale
investments of 15 million CFP or more, and local
commune elections. In addition, Paris divided
the New Caledonia into four subdivisions,
each administered by a centrally appointed
sub-prefect, fueling UC fears of departmentali-
zation (Colombani, 1999: 59-67). Even loyalist
Caledonian Senator Henri Lafleur criticized the
new laws as “an act of distrust” by France
(Lafleur, 1969). Self-determination in New
Caledonia seemed dead.
Why this retrograde policy? Jean-Marie
Colombani speculates that because nickel
prices were rising, and the UC was talking of
inviting outside investment from INCO of Can-
ada to counter the local monopoly held by the
Rothschild-controlled Société le Nickel (SLN): 
“The French state had thus judged it necessary to
master the development of New Caledonia in the
interest of course of its inhabitants, but also in the
interest of the nation.” (Colombani, 1999: 65)
Billotte himself had told Le Monde (20/1/68)
that he wanted to “put a brake on speculations”
about diversifying New Caledonia’s invest-
ments. Certainly the profit motive was a factor,
as nickel exports tripled between 1966 and
1969; in 1968 alone, the value of ore exports
rose 63%. Japan bought about half of those
exports, and it was making about US $1 billion
a year from selling military supplies to the
United States for its war in Vietnam (Postel-
Vinay et al., 1971; Forsberg, 2000: 258, n.10).
Yet France also had strategic ambitions, as
exemplified in its arms sales abroad and the
transfer of its nuclear testing program from
Algeria to French Polynesia in the mid-1960s.
New Caledonia was an important naval base,
and its nickel was crucial for the armament and
aeronautic industries, because as an alloy it
hardens metals for armor, nuclear arms and
missiles (Maclellan and Chesneaux, 1998; Yost,
1988). In late 1968, the new DOM-TOM Secre-
tary, Michel Inchauspé, said that France had a
“duty” to control such strategic resources in the
“national interest” (FA, 6/12/1968). As Jean
Freyss has written: 
“nickel is considered, like oil, as an element of
national independence […].” (Freyss, 1995: 82)
Rival versions of nationhood and decoloniza-
tion also clashed when the nickel boom stimu-
lated massive immigration. The population of
New Caledonia increased by one-fifth between
1969 and 1971, as 15,000 French and Polyne-
sians arrived. By 1976, there were 25,000 new
settlers, including about 2,000 pied noir exiles
from Algeria, who were “completely foreign to
the history of this territory and who were hardly
concerned with the slogan ‘two colors, one
people’” (Freyss, 1995: 26; Postel-Vinay et al.,
1971: 32; Lyons, 1986: 122). Even local-born
Europeans resented the zoreilles who often
brought with them better educational and
employment qualifications as well as attitudes
of superiority. As Frédéric Bobin notes: 
“During the euphoria of the nickel boom of 1968-
1972 there were numerous incidents of verbal and
physical abuse between Caldoches and newcomers,
who were referred to as invaders.” (1991: 304)
Yet France actively encouraged this migra-
tion by creating a special recruiting office.
Noumea Mayor Roger Laroque said the terri-
tory needed to “breed whites” (Bobin, 1991:
304), and Premier Pierre Messmer told his
DOM-TOM Secretary that the way to quiet local
nationalism was to create a non-indigenous
majority through “an operation of overseas col-
onization” (Henningham, 1992: 62-63). 
Building Castles in Cuba and China 
France has a revolutionary as well as a colo-
nizing heritage. The republicans of 1789 and
after often proclaimed that their political values
were universal and that its colonized peoples
should be grateful to assimilate to French laws,
language and civilization. Yet the metropolitan
media also represented non-Europeans as living
outside of history and used racist images to por-
tray both colonial subjects overseas and immi-
grants (Blanchard and Bancel, 1998). In this
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contradictory context, African and Antillean stu-
dents in Paris developed the idea of Négritude, a
celebration of black pride, and in the 1950s
Cheikh Anta Diop argued that the ancient Egyp-
tians were black, so that “civilization” ultimately
came from Africa. Pan-Africanism inspired
many students in France to see themselves as the
vanguard of independence that swept across
Africa (Guimont, 1998). In addition, the long
war over Algeria not only toppled the Fourth
Republic, and sent 900,000 Europeans fleeing
across the Mediterranean from an Arab Socialist
revolution, but also provoked intense debates
about decolonization and national identity
among intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon, Albert
Memmi, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and
Pierre Bourdieu (Le Sueur, 2001). 
In the 1960s, a broader Third Worldism sym-
bolized by the Non-Aligned Movement created
an almost millenarian opposition to imperial-
ism (Willetts, 1978). It was the era of armed
African liberation movements against Portu-
gal and British settler colonies, the spreading
influence of the Cuban revolution, the Chinese
Cultural Revolution against revisionism, and
Ho Chi Minh’s second war against outside
domination. That last struggle became a symbol
to many radicals that US support for “freedom”
in the Cold War often interfered with decoloni-
zation (Rosaldo, 1993: 35). In fact, a growing
informal empire threatened self-determination.
U.S. multinational corporations, backed by the
economic restructuring that lending institutions
like the IMF6 and World Bank required for debt-
relief, achieved new heights of power, exploit-
ing millions of Third World poor while often
backing corrupt dictators. Like Marxism, glo-
bal capitalism promised rapid development, but
based on free trade, shifting production, and
“efficient” economies of scale that transcended
nation-states (and labor unions). The quest for
profit used slogans of peace, plenty, and democ-
racy, and modernization theory recommended
the smashing of tradition to free individualism
(Barnet and Müller, 1974; Peet, 1991). Euro-
pean and Japanese multinationals would also
contribute to this “process in which the last sur-
viving internal and external zones of precapi-
talism […] are now ultimately penetrated and
colonized in their turn” (Jameson, 1984: 207). 
The university education that Caledonian and
Kanak students had to travel to France to obtain
thus included concepts of equal human rights,
Third World liberation and class struggle. They
also met other students from all corners of the
empire and beyond, so that their stay in the cos-
mopolitan “mother country” sometimes changed
their perspectives on their own homeland. To
which France were they supposed to assimilate,
the colonizer or the emancipator? Given the
settler-dominated power structure in New Cale-
donia, and the mission reaction against Commu-
nist organizing, the answer is not hard to find,
despite the moderate reformism of the UC. For-
mal education in New Caledonia had long been
the privilege of a small minority, until more state
funds became available after World War II.
Most Melanesians attended tribal missions
and vocational training schools, while better-
off Caledonians usually attended the Lycée La
Pérouse in Noumea as preparation for higher
education in France. A training center for pri-
mary school monitors in Nouville and a trickle
into the seminary in Paita and the Lycée pro-
vided some upward mobility for Melanesians.
In 1962, the first Melanesian earned a bacca-
laureat degree, but gradually more state schol-
arships increased the flow of New Caledonian
students to France (Thompson and Adloff,
1971: 499-504). Not all university students
became radicals, but among those who did, two
main tendancies emerged: Third World leftism
and indigenous nationalism, both of which
often allied against colonialism. 
In 1962, the Association des étudiants de la
Nouvelle-Calédonie et des Nouvelles-Hébrides
(AECH) created a student bulletin, Trait d’union
(TU). AECH was officially non-political, but TU
articles soon addressed issues that returning
graduates would face, such as competition for
jobs from metropolitan migrants, over-depend-
ence on the nickel industry to the detriment of
rural agriculture, and the marginalization of
Melanesians. In 1965, AECH president and TU
editor Jean-Paul Caillard highlighted New
Caledonia’s development needs and called for
a clearer policy, “conceived from the inside,
not the outside […]”. In the same issue, co-
editor Max Chivot interviewed Apollinaire
Anova-Ataba, a Melanesian priest whose the-
sis celebrated Chief Ataï, leader of the largest
native revolt in 1878, as a heroic martyr for
unity and freedom. Apollinaire Anova-Ataba
hoped that Melanesians and other Caledonians
6. International Monetary Fund, which like the World Bank was dominated by US interests.
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could amalgamate, as the UC had been prescrib-
ing, and he regarded the recent loi Jacquinot as
a regressive obstacle to the development of the
Caledonian personality (TU, June/Sept. 1965).
In 1966 Nidoish Naisseline, a high chief’s son,
began a series of essays that borrowed inspira-
tion from Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon and
Albert Memmi, among others. He was one of
the few Melanesians to study at La Pérouse
before moving to France, where he was influ-
enced by liberation theology in a Protestant
lycée. In his higher studies in sociology at the
Sorbonne, he specialized in the search for iden-
tity by young Kanak urban migrants, dialogued
and demonstrated with Marxists and other rad-
icals but never accepted their ideological pater-
nalism (Naisseline, 2001). 
Together, such young intellectuals devel-
oped an anti-colonial discourse that adapted
ideological currents from many sources to the
local needs of decolonization in New Caledonia.
Nidoish Naisseline revalued the derogatory
term Canaque (later Kanak), much as Aimé
Césaire had done with nègre, arguing that
Kanak custom and Western civilization should
learn from and adapt mutually to each other,
instead of expecting the indigenous civilization
to give way. Nidoish Naisseline noted with
irony that it was in France that he discovered
his own “originality”, because he found more
acceptance there than in Noumea, where he
was taught to become French (TU, Jan/Feb
1966). He criticized the way colons used lan-
guage to create an inferiority complex among
Kanaks, with petit nègre and the familiar voice.
Nidoish Naisseline recommended that the edu-
cated Kanak should speak proper French, sub-
versively, “to bring into being a new type of
individual”, an echo of Frantz Fanon (TU, Dec.
1967). Borrowing from Georg W.H. Hegel and
Jean-Paul Sartre, he said that the partial eman-
cipation of Kanaks since World War II had
been a gift from whites that simply allowed the
slave “to eat at the table of the master”. The
Kanaks needed to struggle like American
blacks for full recognition as equals to con-
struct a better world (TU, Jan/Mar 1968). It was
clearly colonialism, not France per se, that he
was criticizing. 
By early 1968, student essays in TU addressed
the recolonization of New Caledonia. One writer,
for example, supported the UC’s proposal to
allow a second nickel mining company, such as
INCO, to break the SLN monopoly. During the
May student-worker revolt, various New Cale-
donians participated as individuals, and Jean-
Paul Caillard’s bloody photo after being beaten
by police appeared in L’Express and in the
home press. Those who became radicalized by
the experience formed a Comité d’action pour
l’autonomie de la Calédonie et de la défense de
la France that supported the grassroots France
of people who were demanding change, not the
state alliance with private business interests that
was taking away self-government in New Cale-
donia. In TU, Jean-Paul Caillard defended the
activism of New Caledonian students in France
against complaints in the home press, arguing
for an autonomy based on better education for
both white Caledonians and Melanesians, so
that outside interests could not dominate either
any longer (TU, Sept/Oct 1968). Nidoish Naisse-
line added an essay about the three phases a
Melanesian student passes through: first he tries
to assimilate, only to regret his lost identity,
then he tries to reject western ways, and finally
he becomes realistic. Rather than living in “an
imaginary future, or an idealized past”, he
decides to solve problems in the “most just”
way, according to “his time” (TU, Dec1968). 
That December, the radical students formed
a new organization, the Association des jeunes
Calédoniens à Paris (AJCP), which launched a
new bulletin in February, 1969, Canaque homme
libre (Kanak Free Man). Max Chivot wrote in
support of autonomy for New Caledonia,
because it had the natural resources to finance
its own development and more trained leaders
were emerging. All the ethnic groups should
integrate, on the basis of equality and of mutual
recognition of their own identities, and develop
better ties with Pacific neighbors. Nidoish
Naisseline defended the activism of Kanak stu-
dents, arguing that despite racist accusations by
the home press, they were not the dupes of left-
ists. He reminded his readers of how the 1931
Colonial Exposition in Paris had also stereotyped
Kanaks to deny their humanity. He compared
Kanak radicals to the rebellious peasants in
Brittany, anti-nuclear Tahitians and protesters
in Guadaloupe. In response to right-wing claims
that French settlers had developed New Caledo-
nian resources and thus benefited Kanaks,
Nidoish Naisseline pointed out that Kanaks
were not even allowed into certain hotels in
Noumea except as folkloric performers. In
Fanonian tones, he wrote that the systemic vio-
lence of colonial rule in New Caledonia left
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those who wished to restore the Melanesian
personality with only two choices: to dialogue,
or to revolt. Capitalism and colonialism had
forced the native to struggle against both an
exploitative economic system and racial deni-
gration: 
“a new combat is born, that of the liberation of the
native: to give him a chance, to see him finally
restored to his dignity and responsible with all Cale-
donians for the happiness of everyone.” (Canaque
homme libre 1, 1969)
Clearly, the radical students were interacting
with both the conservative home press, which
was usually financed by local business interests,
and with global activism of which May 1968
was one episode. Jean-Pierre Devillers, a Cale-
donian literature student in Aix-en-Provence,
argued that the student-worker uprising had
encouraged large numbers of people to redis-
cover Marxism, but it was of a Third World
variety inspired by Che Guevara’s image of
small groups of mobile guerrillas and Mao’s
mass line of party-peasant dialogue not the
Trotskyist “cult of the theoretician”. Jean-
Pierre Devillers recommended leadership that
was more representative of and responsible to
the grassroots, albeit disciplined by democratic
centralism (Archives Caillard, 1969). In May
1968, radical students and workers had destabi-
lized France almost as much as paratroopers
and terrorists had in 1958. But the Fifth Repub-
lic endured, despite a weakening of Charles de
Gaulle’s prestige that contributed to his down-
fall in April 1969 (Wright, 1981: 429; Thomp-
son and Adloff, 1971: 327-28). Meanwhile,
Guevara’s Bolivian adventure had proven fatal,
and Mao’s youthful Red Guards provoked an
army backlash (Chaliand, 1978; Dirlik, 2000).
The radical New Caledonian students in France
were only a handful, comprising a study group
called GAIAC (Groupe d’action pour l’indépen-
dance accélérée de la Calédonie). Might the
recolonization at home provide the necessary
conditions to stir up anti-colonial action? After
all, a small Communist Party had sparked the
eventual rise of the autonomist UC. 
The Foulards rouges
In their summer vacation at home in 1969,
Caledonian and Kanak radicals would try to
apply some ideas and tactics they had learned
in “revolutionary” France. They found support
at first among some SLN workers, dissident pol-
iticians and Loyalty Islanders. For example, in
June 1968, a small group of leftists who worked
at the Doniambo nickel processing plant had
founded a Marxist bulletin called Sikiss. They
resented the biased, superficial coverage of the
May uprising in France and accused the local
bourgeoisie, including the UC leadership, of
being colonial reactionaries. Sikiss defended
Nidoish Naisseline’s controversial essays in TU
as being the first reflections by a native “out-
side the narrow framework of established
ideas”. They offered up heroes ranging from
Guevara and Mao to Louise Michel, an anar-
chist who had been exiled to New Caledonia
after the Paris Commune of 1871, and criti-
cized the celebration of French annexation on
September 24th as blind chauvinism. The edi-
tor of Sikiss, Gerald Moglia, who was an active
unionist, had won nearly a thousand votes in
the 1967 TA election, but Sikiss noted that pro-
letarian consciousness was limited by a racist
class system that pitted poor whites against
poorer Melanesians. Moreover, the nickel boom
immigrants, including Polynesians from other
French Pacific colonies, were inclined toward
opportunism, not revolution (Sikiss, AC). 
Jean-Paul Caillard, Jean-Pierre Devillers and
others met informally with such kindred spir-
its in Noumea and planned ways to raise anti-
colonial consciousness. On the night of Satur-
day, 12th July, their group painted on the walls
of public buildings in Noumea revolutionary
slogans such as “Down with Colonialism, Free
Caledonia, and Independence Yes!”. Public
works employees erased the graffiti before
Bastille Day on Monday, 14th July, but the pub-
licity caused a stir in the local press, which con-
demned the “degradation of public edifices”
and noted that the few young hotheads respon-
sible, including Jean-Paul Caillard and Jean-
Pierre Devillers, had been arrested (VC, 16/7/
1969). The radicals explained their actions,
arguing that a colonial situation existed in New
Caledonia, because people were not being pre-
pared to control their own economic future, the
elected TA had no real authority over law-mak-
ing, the local ruling class owned the media and
thus prevented the legal spreading of anti-colo-
nial information, and the French administration
“illegally” occupied the buildings where the
graffiti had been painted (Archives Caillard).
Sikiss praised the three young wall-painters as
patriots, but Jean-Pierre Devillers suggested that
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they should try to form local action committees
and, in particular, to mobilize Melanesian stu-
dents (Sikiss, 7/1969; AT 107W: 667)7. 
One week later, Nidoish Naisseline arrived in
Noumea on summer vacation, and being the
son of a high chief on Mare would enable him
to cause what became known as the réveil
canaque (Kanak Awakening). His anti-colo-
nial reputation had preceded his return to
New Caledonia, because of his articles in TU
and Canaque homme libre, including a letter
printed in the latter that claimed he wanted
colons to be confined to reserves and made to
dance the waltz and tango for black American
tourists. Drawing inspiration from the raised
fist protest of black American athletes at the
1968 Olympics in Mexico, Nidoish Naisseline
targeted the upcoming Pacific Games in Port
Moresby, Papua New Guinea. He and other rad-
icals spoke to the apolitical Melanesian Cultural
Association8 and found some support. Late on
7th August, the night before the three graffiti
painters of 12th July went on trial, several
young Melanesians painted graffiti on public
buildings. The new graffiti condemned colonial
racism and advocated a boycott of the Moresby
games, because participation would conceal the
inequality of Melanesians at home; a few slo-
gans were also anti-white. The next morning,
the white radicals, bolstered by the attendance
of their supporters, turned their trial into a polit-
ical platform and received suspended sen-
tences with fines. Outside the Police Commis-
sariat that evening, Nidoish Naisseline and
fifty other Melanesians demanded the release
of those arrested for the 7th August graffiti.
On 9th August, athletes from Mare wore fou-
lards rouges (red scarves) around their heads as
they left for the Games, and Nidoish Naisseline
raised a fist in salute. Some Mareen athletes
would later repeat that gesture in Port Moresby
(AT, 107W: 667).  
The next act in the Kanak awakening was
provoked by tests of local segregation policies
in restaurants, which in turn led to a tract,
arrests and a momentous riot. Fote Trolue, now
a judge and then a student at Do Kamo, a Prot-
estant high school, recalls hearing the Foulards
rouges (FR) speak at informational meetings.
He said their view of the local situation, having
been outside the country and come into contact
with global revolutionary ideas, opened his
eyes to the habitual second class status that
missionary paternalism had persuaded Melane-
sians to accept. After being refused service in a
restaurant in Baie de Citrons, until he threat-
ened to make a scene, Fote Trolue wrote about
his experience. Entitled “Are we not French?”
it was printed in French and in the indigenous
languages of Lifou and Mare, and distributed.
In fact, when Fote Trolue, Nidoish Naisseline
and French administrators were attending a
chiefly marriage on Lifou, the tract was put
next to each place set at the banquet. The police
arrested thirty people, including several white
radicals, and accused them of two crimes: call-
ing for armed revolt, and publishing in indige-
nous languages without official permission
(Trolue, 2001). The tract condemned racism,
affirmed the Melanesian personality, called for
an independence struggle, and urged Melane-
sians to give up alcohol, to wake up and stop
cooperating with exploitative white colons.
Misunderstood metaphors in the indigenous
versions were sensationalized by the authorities
and local press into an apology for “murder”
and “racial hatred” (VC, 29/10/69). Clearly, only
one political version of France was permitted in
New Caledonia. 
As rumors circulated about a demonstration
on 24th September, Nidoish Naisseline and
some companions arrived in Noumea by plane
from Mare on 2nd September and were arrested
for carrying copies of the anti-colonial tract. He
and six other prisoners were questioned by the
police, while several hundred supporters gath-
ered outside the Commissariat. At the end of
the afternoon, the police would still not release
those arrested, so Melanesians from Mare, who
regarded Nidoish Naisseline as a high chief’s
son and resented what they saw as colonial dis-
respect for his customary rank, pounded on the
door of the Commissariat and threw stones and
bottles at the building. The police charged and
dispersed the crowd, at the cost of two police
injuries, but the violence spread into the center
of Noumea, where rioters used iron or wooden
bars to smash streetlights, store windows and
cars, attacking several whites and seriously
injuring a taxi driver. Thirty arrests followed,
7. Sikiss also pointed out that during the 1965 presidential elections, Gaullist slogans such as “No to Autonomy” had
appeared on buildings, but they were not erased and no one was arrested.
8. The ACM was founded in early 1969 to promote Melanesian education and concrete rural development programs;
backed by the religious associations and encouraged by Paris, it tended to be conciliatory.
196 SOCIÉTÉ DES OCÉANISTES
and more trials and publicity. The local press
called the incident a carefully planned provoca-
tion, but the radicals said the crowd acted spon-
taneously. Either way, nothing like it had been
seen in Noumea since the anti-UC violence of
June 19589. Afterwards, Nidoish Naisseline
wrote: 
“We have decided to say no in order to define our-
selves […]. We struggle for Man and not against the
White Man […]. The condition for racial harmony in
New Caledonia [is] for each ethnic group to develop
its personality as much as possible and to respect the
others instead of wanting to rule them, or letting oth-
ers rule them.” (AT, 107W: 1606) 
One Country, Two Nations?
One week after the riot, a debate in the TA
revealed how the established political parties
were reacting to the FR. The UC introduced a
motion opposing independence, racism and
violent demonstrations; it condemned the pro-
testers of 2nd September, demanded the pun-
ishment of those responsible, asked the Admin-
istration to remain vigilant and energetic in
restoring order, and requested the public to
keep calm and help restore an atmosphere of
ethnic harmony (AT, 107W: 1606). The UC had
already been very critical of the graffiti paint-
ers, accusing subversive young white leftists
of “seducing a few Melanesians who lacked
political maturity […]” (AC, 31/7/1969). Henri
Lafleur of the Rassemblement calédonien
responded positively to the UC motion, voicing
dismay that their university students, many of
whom were on territorial scholarships, would
turn against their country: 
“I would simply like to know […] if this affair
doesn’t extend beyond the borders of New Caledo-
nia. And, in the inquiry that will be done, it will be
very important to determine if our students are not
under the influence of certain people, in France, who
sometimes give them advice which goes against the
interests of New Caledonia and Caledonians.” (AT,
107W: 1606)
Neither the UC nor its adversaries were
ready to acknowledge that (a) their children
could have a political vision of their own, or (b)
Gaullist France had already “advised” Caledo-
nians and revoked their autonomy. 
One member of the TA, however, had a differ-
ent view. Yann Céléné Uregei and several other
Melanesians had been distancing themselves
from the UC old guard since early 1968, when
they began to resent paternalistic, conciliatory
European leaders who did not fully support
their motion for internal autonomy. These dis-
sident Melanesians felt that their people had
inferior status because of too little educational
and economic aid. Yann Céléné Uregei had
greeted Nidoish Naisseline at the airport on his
arrival in July 1969, attended his meetings, and
tried to help him when in prison. In the TA dis-
cussion of 2nd September, he called the UC
motion of condemnation premature, because
not enough was known about the origins of
the radical tract. Yann Céléné Uregei praised
Nidoish Naisseline for the sound ideas in his
essays: racism did exist in New Caledonia, and
the young protesters were not promoting it, as
some claimed, but opposing it. The young sub-
jects of Nidoish Naisseline’s father may have
gone too far, Yann Céléné Uregei said, but they
always showed devotion for a high ranking
chief. On Mare, two days before Nidoish Nais-
seline’s arrest, he and his friends had passed out
tracts, only to have the Administration send
over 36 soldiers in two planes, to the shock of
many inhabitants, who remained peaceful.
Yann Céléné Uregei argued that the rioters had
been provoked and were following custom: 
“I am in complete solidarity with all these young
people who seek, I think, to improve the daily life of
Caledonians, whether European or native, and who
don’t seek, far from it, to kill whites as some pre-
tend” (AT, 107W: 1606, TA 9/9/1969). 
Yann Céléné Uregei’s relationship with the
young radicals would fluctuate, but together
they began to open space for more radical anti-
colonial Melanesian politics10. By mid-1970,
the radical students in France divided into two
groups, one white and the other indigenous;
each would study the particular problems of
their own communities and work to bridge
the gap in understanding between them. The
Melanesian group began to publish a journal
9. A white Self-Defense Committee distributed a tract after the riot, blaming Maoists for trying to ruin the ethnic
peace in New Caledonia and vowing to descend into the streets to protect lives and property.
10. Protestant Pastor Raymond Charlemagne had moved in this direction in the mid-1950s, breaking from the mode-
rate religious association he had helped to found and leading his new Free Evangelical Church toward stronger Melane-
sian promotion through political reform and education. He too had turned against the UC.
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called Réveil canaque (RC), which was first dis-
tributed after Nidoish Naisseline came home
again in August to be tried for the tract of 1969.
At the trial, he declared: 
“It’s true, we wanted to commit two murders: that
of the myth of white racial superiority and that of the
myth of Canaque savagery.” 
The Kanaks had no desire to dominate or
harm white Caledonians, he said, but simply
wanted to escape their assigned role of “head-
less” bodies whom the European intelligence
needed to civilize: 
“To the refusal of self that colonialism imposes on
us we respond with the acceptance of self […] of the
Canaque personality […]. We must struggle against
racism because it prevents us all from posing the
essential problem: that of class struggle. Unite,
exploited peoples of Caledonia.” (CN, 19/11/1970)11. 
RC called 1969 the Year I and likened the
2nd September demonstration to storming a
Caledonian Bastille, because the Kanak people
were no longer divided. It also regarded Chief
Ataï of 1878 as a hero and criticized the statue
in the center of Noumea that portrayed him
kneeling to surrender (RC, 9/1970). 
The Foulards supported Yann Céléné Ure-
gei’s candidacy for the TA Presidency in the
September 1970 election, but he lost to Jean
Lèques of the UC. This setback pushed Yann
Céléné Uregei to resign from the UC along with
several other Melanesians in the TA to form a
party of their own, the Union multiraciale de la
Nouvelle-Calédonie (UMNC). At the first UMNC
congress in January 1971, he said that the UC
had become too bourgeois, had outlived its his-
torical role for Melanesians, and kept them in
submission and inferiority. The young students
had opened a new phase of Kanak promotion,
when the indigenous people needed to choose
their own future while protecting their culture,
and only internal autonomy would make that
possible (RC, 5/2/1971). The FR wanted inde-
pendence, but they allied with Yann Céléné
Uregei because he had supported them in 1969
and had now formed the first Kanak-based
party. But some worried that he was a dupe or
too opportunistic. In July 1971, he traveled to
France and Switzerland and met with Baron
Rothschild and other powerful financial leaders
of the Moral Rearmament Movement, which
for thirty years had preached that capitalism
was good because only a few employers were
not. The UC openly accused Gaullists of play-
ing divide and rule by using Yann Céléné Ure-
gei to split the party (AC, 15/12/71). In Septem-
ber 1972, the UC lost the TA election for the first
time in almost twenty years, due to loyalist
immigration and the defection of both the
UMNC and Jean Lèques’s Mouvement libéral
calédonien. By early 1973, Yann Céléné Ure-
gei excluded Max Chivot’s AWA group (who
were publishing a satirical leftist journal) from
the UMNC and broke with the FR, calling them
“extremists”. In July and again in October, he
allied with the anti-autonomists to win elec-
tion as TA President, ironically becoming what
Jean-Paul Caillard called the “representative
Melanesian” that local business interests had
always wanted to head a loyalist majority (VC,
14/11/1973).
Toward “Kanak Independence”
At the January 1972 congress of the UMNC on
Mare, hosted by Nidoish Naisseline’s father,
some FR had chafed at the opening Christian
prayers, which they said mocked their person-
ality. But officially the FR followed customary
protocol and said they learned from their UMNC
elders that “Caledonian unity can only happen
through respecting cultural differences”. They
criticized the presence of the bourgeois media,
which called the UMNC racist, and distin-
guished between the colonial press and sympa-
thetic white leftists in their movement: 
“We firmly believe that the theft of Canaque lands
and the misery of workers represent two faces of a
single reality. ‘Tribes, factories, united front’ is our
slogan.” (RC, 12/2/1972) 
In March, Nidoish Naisseline was arrested
again, this time on his home island of Mare,
and the result was more publicity for the anti-
colonial movement, which now attracted sup-
port even from the UC (AC, 19/4/1972). Nidoish
Naisseline had challenged the authority of the
sub-prefect on Maré to enforce French laws,
so two planes of police arrived to take him to
Noumea in handcuffs. AWA ran a cover cartoon
11. Nidoish Naisseline received a suspended sentence, as did the other prisoners, because the authorship of the tract
and individual acts during the riot were hard to prove. A metropolitan lawyer from the League of the Rights of Man,
Jean-Jacques de Felice, defended them successfully, and would again.
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of Nidoish Naisseline on the cross as Christ,
while Réveil canaque portrayed him with a
headband labeled Ataï. Although condemned to
six months in prison for “threatening a high offi-
cial”, Nidoish Naisseline defended his actions
on the basis of custom: the Administration had
recently confiscated 75 hectares of land on Maré
without consulting Kanak chiefs, and he rejected
colonial authority on Mare, despite the lois Bil-
lotte (RC, 19/5/1972). Typically, Les Nouvelles-
calédoniennes wrote: “custom is no excuse” for
insulting an official (LNC, 22/3/1972).
The UMNC and UC both condemned Nidoish
Naisseline’s conviction in the TA and demanded
the abolition of the Pierre Billotte laws, espe-
cially the change in commune elections, which
they saw as a plot to break up the Melanesian
tribes (AC, 28/3/1972). But tensions continued
among the UC, the UMNC and the radicals over
tactics and policies. In May 1973, young leftists
organized the Union jeunesse calédonienne
(UJC), with support from the FR, Awa, some UC
and UMNC members, unionists, and Alain Ber-
nut’s Mouvement populaire calédonien (MPC).
With Max Chivot as president, the UJC sought
to unite young people to defend their interests
against colonialism: 
“Let’s lose our inferiority complexes that our ene-
mies created inside us to better exploit us.”
RC printed an essay entitled Toward a Caledo-
nian Nation, which rejected the neo-colonialist
line that locals lacked the capacity to build a fra-
ternal country and would only degenerate into
ethnic warfare if France withdrew. It cited the
Kanak unity demonstrated by Ataï in 1878 and
the worker unity shown in the general strike of
1971, arguing that massive immigration and
colonial exploitation were creating a shared
sense of national identity in New Caledonia,
though each community could keep its own per-
sonality (RC, 5/1973). In August, the UJC voted
to support autonomy as a step toward indepen-
dence, and by early 1974 its meetings sported a
Caledonian flag: red and green, with four stars
representing ethnic groups (Archives Caillard). 
After UJC meetings and FR demonstrations
culminated in more arrests on Bastille Day,
1974, Kanak radicals from Grande Terre for-
med Groupe 1878. Unlike the Loyalty Islands,
which were entirely native reserves, less than
ten per cent of Grande Terre was under Kanak
tribal control, so Groupe 1878 prioritized the
restoration of indigenous lands. In September
the radicals chose two symbolic targets, the
colonial statue of Ataï surrendering to Gover-
nor Olry in the Place des Cocotiers, and the
annual commemoration of annexation (since
September 24, 1973, the FR had regarded it as a
day of national mourning). Nidoish Naisseline
and UJC member Jean-Jacques Bourdinat spray-
painted the statue red and green and were later
fined. But police continued to break up mee-
tings and demonstrations by the UJC, FR and
Groupe 1878, including a protest in front of the
Mairie joined by the Pacifist and Anti-Racist
Union. On 24th September, during the official
parade along Anse Vata, Groupe 1878 and the
FR held a small rally. Elie Poigoune jumped
over a barrier by the spectator tribune and called
for independence, followed by Henri Bailly.
Soldiers and police arrested them, along with
Groupe 1878 President Déwé Gorodé12, Berna-
dette Montéapo, and others. At the trial of Élie
Poigoune and Henri Bailly, the judge ordered
the sympathetic audience expelled, but they sta-
ged a sit-in, until attacked by the police, who
arrested a dozen more people. Three days later,
all of the accused offered the judge roses; but
Elie Poigoune got two weeks in jail and Henri
Bailly eight days, and their arrested supporters,
including Jean-Paul Caillard, Jean-Pierre Devil-
lers, Jean-Jacques Bourdinat, Déwé Gorodé,
Robert Casola and others got two to six months
in prison. Sitting was apparently more criminal
than jumping, and white provocateurs got lon-
ger sentences. On release, several continued to
protest, painting public monuments and even
burning the French flag, and were arrested
again (Le Kolonisé, 10/1974; FA, 22/10/1974).
A persistent campaign of civil disobedience
developed, including hunger strikes, tracts,
petitions and support networks from New Cal-
edonia to students and lawyers in France, but
the Administration continued to suppress the
protesters’ freedoms of speech and assembly,
and Paris ignored repeated demands by the TA
to restore autonomy. In January 1975, during
the visit of the DOM-TOMs Secretary Olivier
Stirn, a bomb was set (but disarmed) on the
desk of the President of the TA, and slogans
painted on the walls said, “Kanak13 Independ-
12. She had written about gender issues for the FR and 1878, for example the multiple ways that Kanak women, espe-
cially the educated, risked being alienated from their own people by colonialism (RC, 9/1972).
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ence” (Bailly, Noumea, 2001). That same
month, Groupe 1878 publicly called for revolu-
tionary Kanak independence (Poigoune, Nou-
mea, 2000). They explained in their journal,
Nouvelles 1878, that it meant: (1) the restora-
tion of all Kanak lands—France would have to
pay compensation to non-Kanak landhold-
ers— (2) the nationalization of all mines, (3)
the confiscation of small businesses to redis-
tribute their wealth to the poor, and (4) the
establishment of Kanak citizenship, which
could include non-Kanak who chose to remain
in the country and thus have the right to partic-
ipate in the government. Groupe 1878 clearly
regarded the return of Kanak lands as an essen-
tial precondition for future race relations. Along
with other radical groups, it also strongly
opposed Melanesia 2000, the cultural festival
planned by Jean-Marie Tjibaou in cooperation
with liberals in the French administration, call-
ing it a “sabotage of Kanak Culture” (Nouvelles
1878 9, 1975). The FR espoused Kanak Inde-
pendence in March and formed three branches,
one to work on each Loyalty Island. Déwé
Gorodé also began to travel abroad on behalf of
the movement, first to the Nuclear Free Pacific
conference in Fiji in April and then to New
York in June to speak to the UN Decolonization
Committee in June (Gorodé, Noumea, 2000). 
Meanwhile, Yann Céléné Uregei returned to
a stronger Kanak nationalist position. In May
1975, he traveled to Paris with a TA delegation
to request a new statute for New Caledonia as
well as economic aid because of a fiscal crisis
following the end of the nickel boom. President
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing said he was too busy
to receive them, and Stirn opposed a referen-
dum on autonomy because it implied future
independence. Yann Céléné Uregei left in anger,
telling Le Monde he wanted internal autonomy.
Gaullist Premier Jacques Chirac met with the
remaining TA delegates, and Maurice Lenor-
mand asked him to consider the autonomy pro-
posal. Jacques Chirac’s response TA: 
“There is no choice: it’s the current statute
amended as much as possible or it’s independence,
because internal autonomy became outdated ago.
And since no one wants independence, it seems rea-
sonable to consider amending the current project [i.e.,
limited administrative autonomy].” (FA, 13/6/1975)
Kanak radicals saw this stark choice as either
departmentalization or independence, and the
UMNC declared for Kanak independence. At a
conference in La Conception on 25th June, the
UMNC, some Kanak members of the UC, the FR
and Groupe 1878 issued a communique calling
for a referendum on Kanak independence, the
creation of a single Kanak party, and sending a
delegation to the UN. A Committee of Coordi-
nation for Kanak Independence formed, to con-
tinue discussion about how to define their goals
(Nouvelles 1878 27, 1975). 
The Road to the Events
How exactly could Kanak independence be
achieved? As Groupe 1878 admitted: 
“we don’t have arms, we don’t have the demo-
graphic majority, and there is no political unity
among the Kanak people.” 
They decided to try electoral politics (Nou-
velles 1878, 9). As the FR and Groupe 1878
planned the creation of a formal party, a young
Kanak named Richard Kamouda was shot to
death by a policeman in Noumea. The radicals
called it an assassination, demonstrated in protest
for two days and held meetings around the
country, adding new impetus to anti-colonialism.
In January 1976, independence supporters met
in Amoa on the east coast of Grande Terre and
launched the Parti de libération kanak (PALIKA),
which launched a journal, Kanak, in February
and held its first congress in May. PALIKA
opposed the colonial domination of Kanak
culture and demanded the recovery of Kanak
lands, developed a protest strategy of land occu-
pations. Quoting Mao, it also criticized both the
UC and UMNC for not consulting the mass base
enough and called for “revolutionary combat”
(Kanak 1, 2/1976)14. PALIKA won two TA seats
in 1977, while the UMNC lost supporters who
preferred autonomy as a goal and left to form the
Union progressiste multiraciale (UPM)15. The
former UJC became the Parti socialiste calédon-
ien (PSC), one faction of which supported inde-
pendence, and the uc moved closer to a pro-
independence stand (Caillard, Noumea, 2001;
Barbançon, Noumea, 2001). 
13. Canaque was now spelled with K’s, though only later would it become gender/number neutral.
14. Meanwhile, loyalist opponents had formed an action committee against independence (CACI) nearby.
15. Yann Céléné Uregei sooned formed FULK (Front uni de libération kanak), which had ties with anti-western states.
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Most white Caledonians and other immi-
grants, fearing exclusion, fled toward the
right, and loyalists were already manipulating
dependent Tahitians and Wallisians into vio-
lent action against pro-independence Kanak
(VC, 19/11/1969; AC, 12/6/1974). In April 1977,
Jacques Lafleur (son of Henri) formed the
Rassemblement pour la Calédonie (RPC), with
a platform of loyalist multi-racialism and anti-
leftism; and in July 1978 he combined it with
Jean Lèques’s MLC to form the RPCR (Rassem-
blement pour la Calédonie dans la république)
just in time for a visit by Jacques Chirac. Centrist
Caledonians formed the FNSC (Fédération pour
une nouvelle société calédonienne), allied with
the RPCR and had their own leader elected Presi-
dent of the TA. By 1978, the Administration had
begun integrationist programs of Melanesian
promotion (through education and loans), some
added responsibilities for the GC, economic
development, and land reform, as DOM-TOMs
Secretary Paul Dijoud showed sympathy for
Kanak grievances (Ovington, 1988). But as
more anglophone Oceanian colonies became
independent, PALIKA continued to demand full
independence, and labor unions held major
strikes. In June 1979, a new requirement that
political parties win 7.5% of the votes to gain
seats in the TA forced the UC, FULK, PSC, UPM and
PALIKA to unite in an Independence Front (FI),
which won 14 of 36 TA seats and began to attend
South Pacific Forum meetings (Association pour
la fondation d’un institut kanak..., 1984). 
For some, the election in May 1981 of Social-
ist François Mitterrand as French President
offered hope for peaceful liberation. But for
others the criticism by the new DOM-TOMs Sec-
retary, Henri Emmanuelli, of the colonial situ-
ation in New Caledonia was “hateful” (Chate-
nay, 1993: 343). Moreover, political violence
was already mounting in New Caledonia, as
exemplified in the assassination in 1981 of UC
militant Pierre Declercq, who was replaced as
Secretary General by Éloi Machoro. In 1982,
Jean-Marie Tjibaou’s FI formed an alliance
with the FNSC that enabled him to become GC
Vice President, but in July right-wing extrem-
ists attacked the TA hall (LNC, 22/7/1982). At
Nainville-les-Roches in July 1983, fourteen
years after the first pro-independence graffiti in
Noumea, Socialist Premier Georges Lemoine
tried a last-ditch attempt to negotiate peace
between the FI and the RPCR. The resulting
communique proposed to (a) abolish the colo-
nial situation by recognizing Kanak civilization
as equal to the West, (b) recognize the legiti-
macy of the Kanak people as the first inhabit-
ants and their right to independence, while
accepting the historical legitimacy other groups
as victims of exploitation, and (c) grant a stat-
ute of internal autonomy as a transition to an act
of self-determination. But the RPCR’s voters
would not accept such “demeaning” terms,
leaving the FI (soon the FLNKS16) to carry out its
plan to declare unilateral independence on Sep-
tember 24, 1984, since that goal could not be
negotiated peacefully (Tchoeaoua, 1984: 103,
107 ; Barbançon, Noumea, 2001).
Conclusion
The post-1940 history of New Caledonia has
seen structural cycles of reform and repression.
Gradual multi-ethnic decolonization by the UC
in the late 1940s and 1950s was interrupted by
recolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, when the
Gaullist regime in Paris unilaterally reasserted
its strategic and economic interests, reinforced
by a nickel boom and new immigration. Such a
political and demographic regression could only
offend UC dissidents and young Kanak and Cal-
edonian students returning from France. After
being educated in liberation ideologies and
the practical experience of the May 1968 stu-
dent-worker uprising, a new generation began
another cycle of self-government demands.
1969 was a turning point, making September
not only the month of the prise de possession (or
the wartime rally to Charles de Gaulle) but also
of the Kanak awakening. The outnumbered
Kanak now had to assert their indigeneity as
leverage, but calls for Kanak independence—
tied to socialism—polarized politics and ethnic
relations again. Attempts to find a middle
ground failed (Cherrier, Noumea, 2001; Bar-
bançon, Noumea, 2001), until the Events forced
France and the RPCR to revisit the concepts once
proposed at Nainville. As Georges Chatenay
wrote in 1993:
“History will say if, in the light of the Matignon
Accords [of 1988], the FNSC does not merit a reha-
bilitation […].” (Chatenay, 1993: 342)
16. Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste.
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Nothing is inevitable in history, but many
Kanak felt that their culture was “up against the
wall”17. 
As for the argument that outside influence
caused the Kanak awakening or the Events,
such “advice” clearly came from both sides of
the political spectrum. Gaullist France had
tried to impose its own interests on New Cal-
edonia, and when anti-colonialists pushed for
something beyond autonomy, Paris promoted
integration. The left side of French politics
remains under-represented in New Caledonia,
except perhaps in the militant labor unions and
in PALIKA18. Leftist radicals supported a multi-
ethnic, class-oriented independence, while the
Kanak asserted their own identity as paramount
in their version, which fellow “victims of his-
tory” were expected to support. Today, after the
bloodshed of the 1980s and two negotiated
peace accords, France is again granting auton-
omy to New Caledonia, over the next fifteen
years with a possible referendum on independ-
ence afterwards. Critics warn that this auton-
omy may resemble the colon fantasies of World
War II, but the Kanak have achieved significant
cultural recognition and politically control two
out of three provinces, including important
mining projects in the north (Chappell, 1999).
People seeking reconciliation speak of a pos-
sible “Kanaky New Caledonia”. Yet mining
industry development in the populous, multi-
ethnic, RPCR-controlled south continues to be
neo-colonial in practice19, and a new nickel
boom threatens still more immigration...
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